

Message Text

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15

ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 RSC-01 DRC-01 SS-20 SSO-00 CCO-00 ISO-00 IO-14

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SECTO 85

EO 11652: N/A

TAGS: OVIP (HAK)

SUBJ: SECRETARY'S BACKGROUNDER TO ACCOMPANYING PRESS ON
ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT

1. FOLLOWING IS BACKGROUNDER WHICH THE SECRETARY GAVE THE
ACCOMPANYING PRESS IN JERUSALEM 11:45P.M. JANUARY 17:

2. FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN HAS ANNOUNCED EARLIER THIS EVENING THAT
ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN AGREEMENT WILL BE SIGNED TOMORROW AT KILOMETER
101, AND I WANT TO COMMENT ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AGREEMENT
AND GIVE SOME SENSE ON HOW IT EVOLVED. THE AGREEMENT DELIMITS
MORE OR LESS CERTAIN GEOGRAPHIC AREAS, WHO WILL BE WHERE IN
THEM, AND WHAT AREAS WILL HAVE LIMITATIONS ON THEM. THERE
WAS A PROBLEM AS TO HOW TO INITIATE AN ARRANGEMENT ON
LIMITATIONS. THE US MADE A PROPOSAL, AS EBAN HAS ALREADY
TOLD YOU EARLIER THIS EVENING, AND BOTH ISRAEL AND EGYPT
RESPONDED. THE BASIC AGREEMENT FOR THIS AREA THUS HAS BEEN
SIGNED INDIVIDUALLY BY BOTH COUNTRIES. THIS US PROPOSAL
WILL NOT BE MADE PUBLIC RIGHT AWAY, ALTHOUGH IT WILL BE MADE
KNOWN EVENTUALLY, AND IT INCLUDES TROOP NUMBERS AND ARMAMENTS
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IN AREAS WHICH HAVE BEEN DELIMITED. INCIDENTALLY, CERTAIN

OBSSESSIONS IN THE NEWS, IN FACT, PLAYED NO REAL ROLE IN THE DISCUSSIONS THAT WE HAVE HAD; INSPECTION WAS ONE OF THE LEAST TROUBLESOME. OFF THE RECORD: IT WAS EASIER FOR BOTH SIDES TO ACCEPT A US PROPOSAL THAN TO MAKE DEMANDS FRONTALLY OF EACH OTHER. THUS, THE NUMBERS ISSUE WAS RESOLVED AFTER EXCRUTIATING DISCUSSIONS WITH BOTH SIDES BUT EVENTUALLY WE FOUND A SYMMETRICAL SOLUTION WHICH BOTH COULD ACCEPT.

3. HOW DID ALL OF THIS EVOLVE? WHEN DAYAN WAS IN WASHINGTON, HE HAD IDEAS, SUFFICIENTLY COMPLEX, THAT HE WAS READY TO INJECT INTO A NEGOTIATION. CUSTOMARILY, ANY BASIC PROPOSAL IN ANY NEGOTIATION CONTAINS GREAT COMPLEXITIES. THIS ONE ALSO HAD A MAJOR POLITICAL CONTEXT. DAYAN CONCEIVED THE IDEA THAT I SHOULD BRING HIS IDEAS TO EGYPT AND TRY TO GET A HIGH LEVEL REACTION THERE SO THAT IDEAS COULD BE EXPLORED WITHOUT THERE BEING A TEST OF STRENGTH. I TOLD HIM I WOULD HAVE TO FIND OUT IF SUCH A VENTURE WOULD INDEED TURN INTO A TEST OF STRENGTH. I COMMUNICATED WITH EGYPTIANS TUESDAY MORNING, THEIR TIME. THEY SUGGESTED I COME ON TUESDAY. I COULDN'T MANAGE IT, SO ARRIVED ON FRIDAY NIGHT. KEEP IN MIND THAT MY ROLE WAS TO BE TO SHAPE PHILOSOPHY BEFORE IT BECAME SUBSTANCE. IN MY FIRST TALK WITH SADAT, HE SUGGESTED THAT I MIGHT TRY TO DEAL WITH THE WHOLE AREA WHILE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. AT THAT TIME I DIDN'T KNOW HOW FAST THE ISRAELIS WOULD MOVE. SATURDAY NIGHT AND SUNDAY MORNING THE ISRAELIS AND I WENT INTO GREAT DETAIL OVER ISRAELI IDEAS, AND AFTER A FINAL FORM WAS DECIDED, THE CABINET AGREED THAT I COULD PASS IT TO SADAT. SADAT'S POSITION WAS REALLY MORE AMBITIOUS THAN MINE. HE WANTED TO SEE THE PROPOSAL AND HE WANTED TO FINISH ALL ISSUES WHILE I WAS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. SUNDAY NIGHT I WAS IN EGYPT AND WENT OVER THE PROPOSALS WITH HIM WITH GREAT SPECIFICITY SEEKING TO DECIDE WHAT TO AGREE ON AND THE NATURE OF ARRANGEMENTS TO PUT THEM INTO EFFECT. THE EGYPTIANS HAD CERTAIN VIEWS ON THEIR SIDE AND I DISCUSSED THEM HERE IN JERUSALEM TUESDAY NIGHT AND WEDNESDAY MORNING. THE RESULT OF THOSE DISCUSSIONS LED ME TO BELIEVE WE COULD DEVELOP A FULL AGREEMENT RATHER THAN SOMEWHAT IMPROVED TERMS OF REFERENCE WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN PURSUED IN GENEVA. I CONTINUED THAT PROCESS UNTIL WE REACHED TODAY'S RESULTS.

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4. THE MAJOR US CONTRIBUTION WAS NOT THAT WE WERE OFFERING SPECIFIC OR BRILLIANT IDEAS BUT RATHER THAT EACH COUNTRY COULD SAY TO US WHAT THEY WERE NOT YET READY TO SAY TO EACH OTHER. EACH SIDE SUGGESTED FROM TIME TO TIME THAT I SHOULD OFFER SOMETHING ON ITS BEHALF WHEN IT WAS READY TO SETTLE FOR LESS. I DECLINED AND SAID THAT MY ROLE WOULD HAVE TO BE TO PRESENT THE REAL CONCERNS OF EACH SIDE, TO MAINTAIN THE CONFIDENCE OF EACH SIDE, AND TO NARROW THE GAP GRADUALLY. THERE HAS TO BE

THIS FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENT OF CONFIDENCE; A PURELY MILITARY AGREEMENT CAN ERODE OVER TIME. IN CONNECTION WITH THIS PARTICULAR AGREEMENT, IF ANYTHING CHANGES THE PRESENT POLITICAL CLIMATE, WE MAY BE ABLE TO LOOK BACK ON THIS AS A REALLY IMPORTANT EVENT IN THIS AREA..

5. (IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS, THE SECRETARY MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:)

THE US CONCEPT OF A REASONABLE LIMITATION ARRANGEMENT BEGAN ON MONDAY IN CONVERSATIONS WITH SADAT. THE NUMBERS FLUCTUATED OVER THE WEEK IN THIS COMPLEX SUBJECT. INCIDENTALLY, IN ADDITION TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT TONIGHT AND THE DOCUMENT THAT WILL BE SIGNED AT KILOMETER 101, THERE ARE ALSO SOME OTHER UNDERSTANDINGS, ON PAPER AND NOT ON PAPER, BUT CLEARLY EXPRESSED TO EACH SIDE. EVERYTHING THAT IS NECESSARY IS ON PAPER.

6. OFF THE RECORD: I BELIEVE SADAT WAS THE CRUCIAL FACTOR IN THIS NEGOTIATION.

7. MRS. MEIR PLAYED A VERY IMPORTANT ROLE, ALTHOUGH AUTHORITY IS DIFFUSED HERE IN ISRAEL. AT THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S DINNER DURING MY LAST VISIT TO JERUSALEM, THERE DEVELOPED A TRUE UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT WAS REQUIRED FOR THE SAKE OF ISRAEL AND OF ALL. DAYAN PLAYED A USEFUL ROLE. THIS WAS A PAINFUL PROCESS FOR ISRAEL BUT SOMEWHERE ALONG THE WAY THEY CAME TO RECOGNIZE THEY HAD TO CHANGE THE PATTERN UNDER WHICH THEY LIVE AND THIS WAS A MAJOR HOPEFUL DEVELOPMENT. BOTH, I THINK, FEEL THEY HAVE TURNED A CORNER. MANY IN THE MIDDLE EAST MAY NOT SHARE THIS POINT OF VIEW AND OTHER BIG POWERS MAY WISH TO INJECT THEMSELVES. HENCE, THE SITUATION IS VERY FRAGILE. INDEED, DOWN THE ROAD THE POINT OF VIEW OF ISRAEL AND EGYPT MAY AGAIN BECOME INCOMPATIBLE.

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8. THIS WAS NOT IN ANY WAY A STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE US AND ISRAEL. AS NOVEMBER DEVELOPED THEIR COMPLEXES SUBSTANTIALLY DISAPPEARED AND THEY HAVE COME TO VIEW THEIR FUTURE NEEDS IN THE WORLD RATIONALLY.

9. WE HAVE KEPT THE SOVIETS INFORMED AS I WENT ALONG. I HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT THEY WILL TRY TO THWART SOMETHING WHICH THE GENEVA CONFERENCE SET AS ITS FIRST GOAL. WE HAVE NO INTENTION TO TRY TO SQUEEZE THE SOVIETS OUT OF THE MIDDLE EAST. THE CIRCUMSTANCES LEFT THE US TRUSTED BY BOTH SIDES AND WE HAVE OPERATED ACCORDINGLY.

10. YOU ASK, IS THE LONG-RANGE ISRAELI FEAR WARRANTED? TWO MONTHS AGO I WOULD HAVE BEEN INCLINED TO AGREE. TODAY, I THINK THE PROBLEM IS ON THE WAY TO BECOMING ATTENUATED. IT

WOULD DISAPPEAR ALL THAT QUICKLY. STILL, THE EGYPTIANS HAVE DONE THINGS IN THE COURSE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH SEEM TO INDICATE THAT THEY HAVE OPTED FOR PEACE. SADAT HAS TO COMPOTE HIMSELF TAKING INTO ACCOUNT HIS DOMESTIC SITUATION AND HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES. HE DOES, HOWEVER, IMPRESS ME AS HAVING GREAT SERENITY AND WHILE AWARE OF INTERNAL AND ARABIC PRESSURES, HAS FIRMLY CHARTED HIS COURSE AND STUCK TO IT. YOU SHOULD TREAT THIS ON DEEP BACKGROUND BECAUSE PRAISE FROM THE US IS NOT EXACTLY WHAT HE NEEDS.

11. ISRAEL'S REAL SECURITY, AND INDEED EGYPT'S IS ENHANCED BY THIS AGREEMENT. IN A DESERT BATTLE, WHERE YOU ARE MATTERS LESS THAN THE CONDITIONS WHEN WAR STARTS. A UNITED NATIONS ZONE OF SEPARATION WILL MAKE IT PHYSICALLY HARDER TO STRIKE FREELY. HOWEVER, NO AGREEMENT IS AUTOMATIC AND SELF-ENFORCING..

12. I HAVE DECIDED I WILL FINISH MY EFFORTS BY TONIGHT AND LEAVE WHATEVER WAS LEFT OVER FOR GENEVA. ONLY THIS MORNING DID I SEE HOW MUCH I COULD ACHIEVE. IN FACT, UNTIL 7:45 TONIGHT I DID NOT KNOW ABOUT TWO OF THE PROVISIONS FROM SADAT. BOTH SIDES KNEW I HAD PLANNED TO WIND UP ABOUT NOW AND KNEW I WOULDN'T HANG AROUND TO PAW OVER DETAILS. NOW ALL OF IT HAS FALLEN INTO PLACE.
KISSINGER

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